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The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed weaknesses 
in disease surveillance in nearly all countries. Early 
identification of COVID-19 cases and clusters for rapid 
containment was hampered by inadequate diagnostic 
capacity, insufficient contact tracing, fragmented data 
systems, incomplete data insights for public health 
responders, and suboptimal governance of all these 
elements. Once SARS-CoV-2 became widespread, 
interventions to control community transmission 
were undermined by weak surveillance of cases 
and insufficient national capacity to integrate data 
for timely adjustment of public health measures.1,2 
Although some countries had little or no reliable data, 
others did not share data consistently with their own 
populations and with WHO and other multilateral 
agencies. The emergence of SARS-CoV-2 variants has 
highlighted inadequate national pathogen genomic 
sequencing capacities in many countries and led to calls 
for expanded virus sequencing. However, sequencing 
without epidemiological and clinical surveillance 
data is insufficient to show whether new SARS-CoV-2 
variants are more transmissible, more lethal, or more 
capable of evading immunity, including vaccine-
induced immunity.3,4
Public health decision making relies on real-time, 
accurate surveillance.5 As communities and economies 
struggle to recover from the consequences of these 
surveillance deficiencies, now is the time for countries 
and multilateral agencies to take a hard look at what 
failed and to act boldly to implement the necessary 
improvements to disease surveillance.
Future disease surveillance should comprise well 
integrated national systems based on five principles 
(table). First, a strong surveillance foundation should 
monitor the population in a systematic, consistent, and 
statistically sound way. Second, surveillance systems 
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the reduction of cardiovascular disease burden in 
women worldwide. The Commission’s recommendations 
on additional funding for women’s cardiovascular 
health programmes, prioritisation of integrated care 
programmes, including combined cardiac and obstetric 
care, and strengthening of the health systems accords 
with efforts to bridge the gap for the world’s worst off.5 
Such a shift in women’s cardiovascular care would be a 
major step towards equity, social justice, and sustainable 
development.
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must incorporate laboratory confirmation appropriately 
scaled for different diseases and risks. Third, surveillance 
systems must be digitised, with unique health identifiers 
to connect individual-level data and with privacy 
safeguards. Fourth, surveillance programmes must 
use standardised case definitions and common data 
elements, with appropriate access for the public, local 
and national health authorities, regional bodies, and 
WHO. Fifth, disease surveillance must be adequately 
financed.
Interpretation of disease surveillance data needs 
population representativeness, denominators, and 
historical baseline data. Civil registration and vital 
statistics (CRVS) systems are important for population 
estimation and understanding excess mortality but 
have historically taken years to build. Many countries 
that lack or have inadequate CRVS systems need 
to accelerate their development in alignment with 
the recommendations in the WHO SCORE for Health 
Data Technical Package report.6 In the meantime, 
representative sample registration systems can provide 
denominator and mortality data and can be designed 
to support the development of CRVS systems. Such 
sample registration systems are established in several 
middle-income countries and are being implemented in 
some low-income countries, such as Mozambique and 
Sierra Leone.7
Multiple surveillance systems can be integrated 
on such a population-representative foundation, 
according to the priorities of the country and leveraging 
internal resources, such as surveillance programmes 
run by academic and non-governmental institutions. 
A fully integrated surveillance system could include 
integrated disease surveillance and response, including 
COVID-19 case reporting; pathology-based cause of 
death surveillance;8 electronic health and laboratory 
record data transfer; serological surveillance; vaccine 
adverse events reporting; epizootic and food safety 
surveillance systems on the One Health model; 
participatory community surveillance; and disease-
specific systems for HIV, tuberculosis, malaria, vaccine-
preventable diseases, and many others. For data linkage 
it is crucial that all systems are digital and that unique 
health identifiers are assigned to everybody in the 
population. Privacy protection, including review by 
privacy watchdogs, must be established.
Surveillance data reviews should trigger rapid 
public health action locally. National public health 
institutes (NPHIs) should be charged with collating 
and analysing data nationally and coordinating 
or undertaking modelling of disease patterns and 
pathogen evolution to guide public health suppression 
measures, border policies, vaccine development and 
deployment, and treatment protocols. NPHIs should 
have the mandate and systems to share information 
about transnational health threats with international 
bodies under the International Health Regulations 
(2005), and these bodies must commit to full 
transparency of the data they receive. Additionally, 
NPHIs should monitor key performance indicators, 
such as time to detect, report, investigate, and control 
disease outbreaks.
Adequate financing and the creation of a sustainable 
market will be needed for the establishment and 
continual maintenance of surveillance infrastructure. 
Countries should expect to spend about US$1–4 per 
capita annually on disease surveillance infrastructure 
and personnel.9 For low-income and middle-income 
countries, substantially more start-up investment 
is likely to be required to strengthen laboratory 
capacities, data systems, and human resource capacity, 
as part of larger investments in health systems 
strengthening; some of this cost will need to be met 
by donors and high-income countries. Dedicated 
investments will also be needed to ensure that high-
risk populations, especially in humanitarian contexts, 
are not excluded from improved surveillance systems. 






mortality rates and disease 
burden




Cases accurately tracked Capacity to scale testing 
and sequence pathogens
Digital data Systems interconnected 
and privacy protected





Visibility of all national 
threats by NPHIs and by 
WHO for transnational 
threats
Automated reporting to 
NPHI with a subset to 





Invest US$1–4 per capita 
annually
CRVS=civil registration and vital statistics. NPHI=national public health institute.
Table: Core principles for integrated disease surveillance
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Violent global conflict has forcibly displaced 
79·5 million people worldwide, many of whom have 
expe rienced torture.1 Although the systematic use of 
torture is not new, torture as experienced by refugees 
fleeing war and persecution has become increasingly 
brutal. Indeed, in many parts of the world, the purpose 
of torture is no longer to teach a lesson or to extract 
a confession, but to embody cruelty in its most 
extreme form.2 When appealing for refuge, asylum 
seekers describe experiencing violence that exceeds 
the standard definition of torture.3 Medical and legal 
communities have yet to adopt adequate language to 
describe this purposeful, extreme violence.
The World Medical Association Declaration of Tokyo 
defines torture as the “deliberate, systematic or 
wanton infliction of physical or mental suffering by 
one or more persons acting alone or on the orders 
of any authority, to force another person to yield 
information, to make a confession, or for any other 
reason”.4 Torture is the deliberate harm of a person by 
From torture to ultraviolence: medical and legal implications
proportion of the $249 per person average annual 
military spending and the more than $10 trillion in 
estimated economic costs from inadequate disease 
surveillance.10
Piecemeal, antiquated public health surveillance must 
be robustly transformed into a modern system. As the 
COVID-19 pandemic has shown, weak surveillance 
limits the ability of countries to detect and rapidly 
respond to health threats and harness the benefits from 
innovations such as pathogen genomic sequencing, 
mRNA vaccines, and novel antivirals. Bold changes to 
implement fully interconnected disease surveillance 
are needed to manage the risks posed by SARS-CoV-2 
variants and future pandemics.
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